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ABSTRACT 
Security ICs are vulnerable to side-channel attacks (SCAs) that 
find the secret key by monitoring the power consumption and 
other information that is leaked by the switching behavior of digi-
tal CMOS gates. This paper describes a side-channel attack resis-
tant coprocessor IC and its design techniques. The IC has been 
fabricated in 0.18µm CMOS. The coprocessor, which is used for 
embedded cryptographic and biometric processing, consists of 
four components: an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) based 
cryptographic engine, a fingerprint-matching oracle, a template 
storage, and an interface unit. Two functionally identical coproc-
essors have been fabricated on the same die. The first, ‘secure’, 
coprocessor is implemented using a logic style called Wave Dy-
namic Digital Logic (WDDL) and a layout technique called dif-
ferential routing. The second, ‘insecure’, coprocessor is imple-
mented using regular standard cells and regular routing tech-
niques. Measurement-based experimental results show that a dif-
ferential power analysis (DPA) attack on the insecure coprocessor 
requires only 8,000 acquisitions to disclose the entire 128b secret 
key. The same attack on the secure coprocessor still does not dis-
close the entire secret key at 1,500,000 acquisitions. This im-
provement in DPA resistance of at least 2 orders of magnitude 
makes the attack de facto infeasible. The required number of 
measurements is larger than the lifetime of the secret key in most 
practical systems.  
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
B.7 [Hardware]: Integrated Circuits; E.3 [Data]: Data encryp-
tion. 
General Terms 
Design, Security. 
Keywords 
Countermeasure, Side-Channel Attack, Differential Power Analy-
sis, Encryption, Smart Card, Security IC. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The integrated circuit is the emerging vulnerability in the security 
of an embedded application. Due to physical and electrical effects, 
the IC broadcasts information that is related to the secret key used 
in the encryption operation. In recent years, several attacks have 
been reported that use information from so-called side-channels to 
find the secret key. These side-channel attacks are non-invasive 
and observe the device under normal operation. They analyze 
information ranging from time delay and power consumption to 
electromagnetic radiation. SCAs are a real threat for any device in 
which the security IC is easily observable, such as smart cards and 
embedded devices [1],[2].  
Side-channel attacks are not a new practice. One of the most well-
known examples is a safecracker who uses his fingers and ears to 
feel and listen to the tumblers impacting each other while turning 
the dial. By observing when the lock's tumblers fall into place, he 
can crack the combination lock quickly and much faster than any-
one who attempts to open the safe by trying every possible com-
bination.  
In electronic circuits, the variations in power consumption can be 
used as the equivalent of the falling tumblers in a lock. The effect 
on the circuit’s secure operation is devastating. For example, a 
brute force attack on the AES algorithm, in which you try each 
and every possible value of the 128b key, is impossible with to-
day’s technology. With the differential power analysis attack, 
however, we have been able to find the key of the unprotected 
coprocessor in less than three minutes, from the start of the meas-
urements to the end of the analysis. It shows that security is only 
as strong as its weakest link. 
Constant power consuming logic gates are used to protect 
ThumbPod, a next-generation portable biometric and crypto-
graphic authentication device, against power analyses. When the 
power consumption of the smallest building block is a constant 
and independent of the signal activity, no information is leaked 
through the power supply and power attacks are impossible. To 
minimize the area and power overhead, only the sensitive parts of 
the embedded system are adjusted. Architectural partitioning has 
been performed to divide the system into an insensitive and a 
sensitive module.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next sec-
tion describes the IC system architecture. It discusses (1) the 
Thumbpod architecture; (2) the AES-based cryptographic engine; 
(3) the reference template storage; (4) the fingerprint matching 
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algorithm; (5) the coprocessor interface; and (6) the build-in self 
test and functional tests. Section 3 describes the DPA counter-
measure. It discusses (1) a methodology to achieve a 100% 
switching factor with standard single ended static complementary 
CMOS gates; and (2) a place & route methodology to control the 
parasitic effects on the interconnect wires for constant load ca-
pacitance. In section 4, the concept of a DPA is explained together 
with our measurement setup and an attack is mounted on the fab-
ricated IC to asses the increase in DPA resistance of the secure 
coprocessor. This section also presents area, timing and power 
numbers. Section 5 presents related state-of-the-art.  
2.  IC SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
2.1  ThumbPod embedded system architecture 
The coprocessor is part of the embedded system (ThumbPod) in 
Figure 1, which is a portable biometric and cryptographic authen-
tication device. ThumbPod is a biometrically-driven electronic 
key that establishes a strong and secure bond between the owner 
of the key and the key itself. ThumbPod scans a person’s finger-
print, analyzes the spatial features of the fingerprint, compares 
them to a prestored template and generates a positive or negative 
authentication. It also implements a variety of AES-based symme-
try key cryptography primitives for secure interaction with a re-
mote server.  
Architectural partitioning has been performed to divide the system 
into insecure (LEON SPARC V8 processor) and secure (coproc-
essor) modules, such that the processing and storage of all sensi-
tive information is done on the secure module. This ensures that 
the entire system does not need to be protected by the circuit 
techniques described here, which require additional power and 
area. Only the secure module must be protected for the system to 
remain secure, thus minimizing such overhead.  
2.2  AES-based cryptographic engine 
The cryptographic engine consists of an AES core with multiple 
modes of operation, along with a controller, registers, and an in-
terface to read/hash the memory. The datapath is based on one 
round of the AES-128 algorithm which consists of byte substitu-
tion, shift row, mix column, and key addition phases along with 
on-the-fly key scheduling in Figure 2. The core is optimized for 
speed, with a goal of minimizing delay for one round. Byte substi-
tution is implemented using look-up tables. A full encryption of 
128b data using a 128b key takes a total of 11 cycles. The crypto 
engine performs AES encryption in ECB (Electronic CodeBook), 
OFB (Output FeedBack), and CBC-MAC (Cipher Block Chaining 
Message Authentication Code) modes without any loss in 
throughput.  
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Figure 2. Architecture of AES core. 
2.3 Reference  template  storage 
The storage of a fingerprint template is performed as a two-
module register file, allowing storage of a single template with up 
to 30 minutiae, each of 119b and consisting of its own angle value 
(5b) and information for six minutiae neighbors: distance to 
neighbor (8b), angle to neighbor (6b), and angle of neighbor (5b). 
The maximum size of a template is thus 3570b. 
2.4  Oracle: fingerprint matching algorithm 
A neighbor-based fingerprint matching algorithm is performed on 
the oracle. To prevent adaptive query attacks, the oracle does not 
provide intermediate feedback to the LEON during the query 
phase, hence its name. The feature extraction of a candidate fin-
gerprint is done on the LEON, which then sends the oracle a 
(fixed) number of queries, each query consisting of an angle 
value, distance to neighbor, angle to neighbor, and angle of 
neighbor along with indexing terms. At each query, the oracle 
loads a section of the pre-stored template and implements correla-
tion functions. After the final query, the oracle makes a final ac-
cept/reject decision that is passed to the cryptographic engine as a 
security flag. The matching oracle algorithm has a false accept 
rate (FAR) of 0.01% and a false reject rate (FRR) of 1.5%.  
2.5  Coprocessor interface and secure 
controllers 
The interface unit allows access to the IC by means of a 20b in-
struction/data input bus and a 17b output bus. The unit uses pipe-
lined registers with logic gates to ensure stable data processing 
with one- or two-sided handshaking protocols. The coprocessor 
can operate with a 50MHz LEON within a range of clock fre-
quencies from 1MHz to 288MHz. The coprocessor contains two 
controllers, one each for the cryptographic engine and the oracle. 
These controllers are programmed with a fixed instruction set and 
are able to communicate with each other using a set of security 
flags (a set of registers shared between them.) Different biometric 
authentication protocols involving both encryption and matching 
functions can thus be implemented. Security is provided by moni-
toring the proper sequence of instructions and rejecting invalid 
instructions.  
For example, a protocol requires an encryption operation only 
after a fingerprint match has been made. If an encryption instruc-
tion arrives either before a match or after a rejection, the crypto-
graphic engine will generate a false encryption token indicating an 
illegal query.   
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Figure 1. System block diagram (fabricated IC is shaded).  
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2.6  Built-in self test (BIST) and functional test 
BIST was implemented on the AES portion of the device both in 
hardware and software modes. In hardware, a BIST_ENABLE pin 
can be set, which feeds a hardwired instruction into the coproces-
sor. Upon reset, the coprocessor loads a zero-vector of data, en-
crypts this with a zero-vector key, and operates in output feedback 
mode (OFB) for 120 encryptions. Upon completion, the coproces-
sor holds its state as the BIST_DONE flag is enabled and 7 bits of 
output appear on the BIST_OUTPUT pins, which are verified 
against pre-known values. 
BIST for the AES can also be operated as a software instruction 
sent from the LEON (or any external processor) to the coproces-
sor. Testing of the entire system was performed against a series of 
pre-defined test scripts operating in C on the LEON, which test 
the software BIST, all modes of the cryptographic engine, the 
matching oracle, as well as a number of protocols to ensure secure 
operation. 
3.  RESISTING DPA ATTACKS WITH 
WDDL AND DIFFERENTIAL ROUTING 
In standard static CMOS, power is only drawn from the power 
supply when a 0 to 1 output transition occurs. (During 0 to 0 and 1 
to 1 transitions, no power is drawn. During a 1 to 0 transition, the 
stored capacitance is discharged to ground.) Therefore, by meas-
uring the power supply of an IC as it encrypts, and then perform-
ing statistical analysis of the measured power traces, the secret 
key can readily be determined. DPA has been effective in extract-
ing the key of both microprocessor-based and ASIC-based en-
cryption systems.  
Makeshift measures, such as the addition of a random power con-
suming module or a current sink, have been proven unsuccessful 
in thwarting power attacks. Currently, two approaches prevail: 
algorithmic countermeasures and hardware techniques. The for-
mer tries to decorrelate the power consumption and the data. Al-
gorithmic countermeasures however, need to be reformulated for 
each algorithm and often proposed solutions actually appear inse-
cure and/or inefficient afterwards [3]. The latter tries to not create 
any side-channel information. The goal is to make the power con-
sumption of the individual logic gates constant and independent of 
their input signals. The major advantages are that this approach is 
correct by construction and is independent of the cryptographic 
algorithm or arithmetic implemented.  
Two conditions must be satisfied to have constant power dissipat-
ing logic: (1) a logic gate must have exactly one charging event 
per clock cycle; and (2) the logic gate must charge a constant 
capacitance in that event. The fabricated IC uses a technique 
called Wave Dynamic Differential Logic (WDDL) to fulfill the 
first condition, and a differential routing technique to fulfill the 
second condition. 
3.1  WDDL: constant power dissipating logic 
Dynamic differential logic, also known as dual rail with precharge 
logic, has one charging event per cycle. Since dynamic logic al-
ternates precharge and evaluation phases and differential logic 
uses true and false signals, exactly one output node becomes 0 in 
the evaluation phase and both output nodes are charged to 1 in the 
precharge phase. 
The fabricated IC uses Wave Dynamic Differential Logic [4] to 
implement dynamic differential behavior using static CMOS stan-
dard cells. A WDDL gate consists of a parallel combination of 
two positive complementary gates. A positive gate produces a 
zero output for an all-zero input. A complementary (or dual) gate 
computes the false output of the original logic gate using the false 
inputs of the original gate. Figure 3 (bottom right) shows the 
WDDL AND and OR gates. In the precharge phase, both true and 
false inputs are set to 0. This puts the output of the gate at 0. This 
0 precharge value travels as the input to the next gate, creating a 
precharge ‘wave’. In the evaluation phase, each input signal is 
differential and the WDDL gate calculates a differential output. 
Special registers and input converters launch the precharge value. 
They produce an all-zero output in the precharge phase (clk-signal 
high) but let the differential signal through during the evaluation 
phase (clk-signal low).  
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Figure 3. Wave dynamic digital logic (WDDL):  
precharge generation and compound gate composition. 
3.2  Differential routing: matching 
interconnect capacitances of dual rail logic 
Besides a 100% switching factor, it is essential that a fixed 
amount of capacitance is charged during the transition. Thus, the 
total load at the true output of the differential gate should match 
the total load at the false output. The load capacitance has three 
main components: (1) the intrinsic output capacitance of the gate, 
(2) the interconnect capacitance, and (3) the intrinsic input capaci-
tance of the load. For high security applications, the contribution 
of all components must be constant. However, the share of the 
interconnect capacitance in the total load capacitance is dominant 
[5]. Hence, the issue of matching the interconnect capacitances of 
the signal wires is crucial for the countermeasure to succeed.  
The best strategy to achieve matched interconnect capacitances is 
to route the true and false output signals with parallel routes that 
are at all times in adjacent tracks of the routing grid, on the same 
layers, and of the same length. Then independent of the place-
ment, the two routes have the same first order parasitic effects.  
Differential pair routing has been available through gridless 
routers. But their goal is to route a few critical signals, such as the 
clock or general reset signal. High-capacity gridded routers on the 
other hand have no or only limited capability to route differential 
pairs. We have recently presented a way to work around tool limi-
tations [6]. In the technique, each differential output pair is ab-
stracted as a single ‘fat’ wire, which has among other characteris-
tics the width of two parallel wires plus spacing. The differential 
design is routed with the fat wire and at the end the fat wire is 
decomposed into the differential wire. Figure 4 demonstrates the 
place & route approach. At the left, the result of the fat routing is 
shown. At the right, the result after decomposition is shown. For 
the secure part of the prototype IC, the capacitances at the true 
and the corresponding false signal nets, directly reported from 
Silicon Ensemble using Simcap, have exactly the same values.  
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The second order parasitics are not reported by this tool, as de-
scribed later. 
         
Figure 4. Differential pair routing methodology:  
fat design (left); and differential design (right).   
3.3 Prototype  IC 
The prototype IC, depicted in Figure 10, consists of two function-
ally-identical coprocessors, fabricated on the same die using a 
TSMC 6M 0.18µm process. An insecure coprocessor, which 
serves as benchmark, is implemented using standard cells and 
regular routing techniques. A secure coprocessor is implemented 
using WDDL and differential routing. Both coprocessors have 
been implemented starting from the same synthesized gate level 
netlist. The WDDL gates have been derived from the commercial 
static CMOS standard cell library used in the regular insecure 
design.  
4.  DPA RESISTANCE: EXPERIMENTAL 
RESULTS 
4.1 Measurement  setup 
The measurement and analysis setup is depicted in Figure 5. The 
core supply current is measured between the PCB decoupling 
capacitances and the IC. A CT1 current probe from Tektronix 
with a 25KHz to 1GHz bandwidth measures the supply current 
variations. For every mA, it provides a 5mV output to the 
HP54542C oscilloscope. The oscilloscope filters the waveform 
transients at 500MHz and digitizes with a 2GHz sampling fre-
quency. To facilitate the synchronization of the measurements, we 
also have access to the encryption start signal. A clock of 50MHz 
is provided to the coprocessor under attack, for which only the 
AES core processes data. The other circuits and modules on the 
insecure coprocessor are quiet, while for the attack on the secure 
coprocessor, they always have the same switching events.  
 
Figure 5. DPA measurement and attack setup. 
Figure 6 shows the encryption start signal and the supply current 
of the coprocessors in OFB mode. The supply current of the inse-
cure coprocessor exhibits large variations. It broadcasts the eleven 
encryption rounds and a high power peak exposes the starting 
point of each new encryption. The power consumption profile of 
the secure implementation on the other hand is invariant and does 
not reveal any information in a simple power analysis. In each 
clock cycle, the same total load capacitance is charged. 
 
Figure 6. Transient measurement (2 encryptions, 22 clock 
cycles) of encryption start signal (top) and core supply current 
(bottom). Standard cells and regular routing (left) and WDDL 
and differential routing (right). 
4.2  Differential power analysis 
In DPA, measured power traces are compared with a prediction 
on the power consumption. Only if the secret key hypothesis is 
correct will the predicted and the actual power consumption be 
correlated. The influence of the datapath on the power consump-
tion of the AES core is estimated through the Hamming distance 
of two successive values of register RB, shown on Figure 2, or in 
other words, through the number of changing state bits in a clock 
cycle. Most AES operations work with bytes and eight state bits 
can be predicted using a guess on one key byte. A brute force 
attack on the AES algorithm requires 2
128 key guesses to try all 
the 128b keys. DPA however, working byte per byte, only re-
quires 16*2
8 key guesses. 
If the guess was correct, the outcome is always equal to the actual 
bit changes and is therefore correlated with the power consump-
tion of the logic operations affected by the bits. Measurement 
errors and the power consumption of the other logic operations 
are uncorrelated. We compare the estimations and the measure-
ments with the correlation test. The correct key guess is the one 
that results in the highest correlation coefficient between the vec-
tor of Hamming distances and the vector of representative meas-
urements, for which we use the maximum supply current in a 
clock cycle.  
For the insecure design, we compare round eleven and the one 
after that. As shown in Figure 7, RB in round eleven (D11) can be 
found by tracing back the signal obtained after xor-ing the final 
ciphertext (C11) and a key guess (K11) through both the shift row 
operation and the substitution box. RB in the next round, during 
which we perform the supply current measurement, is the final 
ciphertext (C11). The correct key byte is found by evaluating:  
max fcost(K11) = corr(Pmodel,Pmeasurement)                                   (1) 
K11 
where  Pmodel = HamDist(sub
-1(shiftrow
-1(K11⊗ C11)),C11) 
 P measurement = max(Isupply,11+1)  
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For the secure design, we only need to look at one round, as all 
signals are at 0 at the start of the evaluation phase. The number of 
changing bits of RB in round eleven, during which we also do the 
measurements, is the Hamming weight of RB. 
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Figure 7. AES core: round 11 (top);  
and round 11 + 1 (bottom). 
Figure 8 shows the encryption start signal and the core supply 
current during the attack. The supply current of the insecure co-
processor reveals the encryption operation. One can count exactly 
eleven peaks. The secure coprocessor has a continuous current 
whether or not data is being processed. It has an identical power 
consumption profile in Figure 7 and in Figure 8. Without the en-
cryption start signal, it is virtually impossible to isolate the en-
cryption. For the actual attack, we only measure the round of in-
terest. The dynamic range is set to cover the variation of the 
maximum current. The other irrelevant samples may be clipped. 
For the remainder of this manuscript, we will refer to the maxi-
mum value of one acquisition as the measurement.  
4.3 DPA  resistance 
The resistance against DPA is quantified with the number of 
measurements to disclosure (MTD). We define MTD as the cross-
over point between the correlation coefficient of the correct key 
and the maximum correlation coefficient of all the wrong keys 
guesses. For both coprocessors, an attack on one key byte is 
shown in Figure 9. MTD is shown in the ‘Correlation vs. Number 
of Measurements’ graphs as the point where the black line (cor-
rect key) crosses the grey envelope (wrong keys). The results for 
the other fifteen key bytes are similar. The maximum number of 
measurements is 15,000 and 1,500,000 for the insecure and the 
secure coprocessor respectively. For the insecure implementation, 
the correct key bytes are found very easily. On average, 2,000 
measurements are required to disclose a key byte. In one case, a 
mere 320 samples were sufficient to mount a successful attack. 
There is also a large resolution; there is no doubt about the correct 
key guess. 
The secure coprocessor on the other hand substantially reduces 
this resolution of correlation, shown by the small correlation 
peaks in the ‘Correlation vs. Key Guess’ graph in Figure 9. Our 
measurements show that out of sixteen keys bytes, WDDL effec-
tively protects five key bytes. One and a half million measure-
ments are not sufficient to disclose the correct key bytes. One 
example is shown on the bottom of Figure 9. The eleven key bytes 
that are found require on average 255,000 measurements, an in-
crease of more than two orders of magnitude when compared with 
the insecure coprocessor.  
The analysis also showed that for a dual rail design, the correla-
tion coefficient of the correct key guess can be negative. This 
means that the more bits change the less power is consumed. This 
actually means that the 0 to 1 switching of the false net uses more 
power than the 0 to 1 switching of the true net. The parasitic ca-
pacitances affected by the false signals are larger than the ones 
affected by the true signals. On the other hand, for the five bytes 
that have not been found, the capacitances have an almost perfect 
matching between the differential nets. Hence it is crucial to guar-
antee matched capacitances consistently for all the logic.  
Further techniques to improve matching include making every 
other metal layer a ground plane, which would completely control 
the capacitance to other layers. Shielding the differential routes on 
either side with a power line would eliminate the cross-talk to 
adjacent wires in the same metal layer. Alternatively, increasing 
the distance between different differential pairs would reduce the 
effect, or an iterative design flow could be used to identify and 
correct mismatches.  
Table 1 summarizes the results. WDDL and differential routing is 
a functioning technique to thwart power attacks. The trade-off is a 
three times increase in area, and a four times increase in power 
consumption and minimum clock period. Security partitioning [7], 
the careful division of the architecture into two parts (a secure and 
a non-secure part) as shown in Figure 1, minimizes the cost for 
 
Figure 8. Transient measurement of encryption start signal 
and core supply current for single encryption:  
Standard cells and regular routing (left);  
and WDDL and differential routing (right). 
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Figure 9. Cracking the secret key: Standard cells and regular 
routing using 15K measurements (top); and WDDL and dif-
ferential routing using 1.5M measurements (bottom).  
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complex systems. Only the relatively small part that processes 
sensitive information requires realization in a coprocessor with 
specialized logic and routing. This minimizes the area and reduces 
the power and time penalty. Even with these penalties, the secure 
coprocessor still runs orders of magnitude faster and expends less 
energy than a software implementation on the main processor.  
Table 1.  IC results summary. 
Parameter Standard  Cell  WDDL 
Gate Count (eq. gates) [K]  199  596 
Area [mm
2]    
 AES  0.79  2.45 
 Oracle  0.11  0.26 
 Memory  1.05  3.21 
 Entire  System  1.98  5.95 
Maximum Frequency (@1.8V) [MHz]     
 AES  330.0  85.5
* 
 Entire  System  288.2  69.0
* 
Maximum Throughput (@1.8V) [Gb/s]     
 AES  3.84  0.99 
Power Consumption (@1.8V, 50 MHz) [W]     
 AES  0.054  0.200
† 
 Entire  System  0.036  0.486
† 
Measurements to Disclosure
‡    
  min     320        21,185 
  mean  2,133      255,391 
  max  8,168   1,276,186  
  Key bytes not found (@1.5M Meas.)  n/a  5 
*Duty factor of clock > 50% to guarantee precharge of all gates
†Estimation based on area ratio AES vs. Entire System
‡Based on correctly guessed key bytes 
5. RELATED  WORK 
As far as we know, this paper will be the first published DPA-
resistant circuit-plus-routing technique implemented and tested in 
actual silicon. All other published countermeasures have never 
been implemented in silicon, or have never been measured and 
attacked, or did not offer any significant DPA resistance.  
A dual rail asynchronous chip has been presented previously [8]. 
The implementation did not provide a significant increase in DPA 
resistance. This failure has been attributed to unbalanced signal 
paths caused by routing differences. Note that if asynchronous 
logic is used to increase the DPA resistance, dual rail encoded 
asynchronous logic must be used. Because of the dual rail logic, 
there is also a factor 3 area increase compared with a single ended 
synchronous benchmark.  
We are aware of one silicon implementation of an algorithmic 
countermeasure [9]. Measurements and assessment of the DPA 
resistance, however, have not yet been performed. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
We have presented a secure coprocessor that does not leak infor-
mation through the power supply, which is a major and easy to 
access side-channel leakage source. Built in a 0.18µm CMOS 
technology, we believe that this is the first IC that is practically 
immune to DPA attacks. Its immunity has been experimentally 
verified and compared to a second IC, built with a regular stan-
dard cell approach. The coprocessor processes the sensitive in-
formation in a biometric and cryptographic authentication device. 
The design approach relies on a logic style that has constant 
power consumption and a place & route technique that controls 
the parasitic effects. An actual power attack has been mounted on 
the IC to experimentally asses the increase in DPA resistance. We 
have presented the measurement setup and analysis technique. 
Experimental results showed that 1,500,000 acquisitions are not 
sufficient to fully disclose the 128b secret key. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This work was supported in part by the National Science Founda-
tion (CCR-0098361), UC-Micro 02-079 and 03-088, Panasonic 
Foundation, SUN Microsystems, Atmel corporation and the Fan-
nie and John Hertz Foundation. 
REFERENCES  
[1]  M. Renaudin, F. Bouesse, P. Proust, J. Tual, L. Sourgen and 
F. Germain, “High Security Smart-cards,” DATE, pp. 228-
233, 2004. 
[2]  P. Kocher, R. Lee, G. McGraw, A. Raghunathan and S. Ravi, 
“Security as a New Dimension in Embedded System De-
sign,” DAC, pp. 753-760, 2004. 
[3]  E. Oswald, S. Mangard and N. Pramstaller, “Secure and 
Efficient Masking of AES – A Mission Impossible?,” IACR 
Cryptology ePrint, 2004. 
[4]  K. Tiri and I. Verbauwhede, “A Logic Level Design Meth-
odology for a Secure DPA Resistant ASIC or FPGA Imple-
mentation,” DATE, pp. 246-251, 2004. 
[5]  K. Tiri and I. Verbauwhede, “A Digital Design Flow for 
Secure Integrated Circuits,” submitted IEEE TCAD. 
[6]  K. Tiri and I. Verbauwhede, “Place and Route for Secure 
Standard Cell Design,” CARDIS, pp. 143-158, 2004.  
[7]  D. Hwang, P. Schaumont, K. Tiri and I. Verbauwhede, 
“Making Embedded Systems Secure,” accepted IEEE Secu-
rity & Privacy Magazine. 
[8]  S. Moore, R. Anderson, R. Mullins, G. Taylor and J. 
Fournier, “Balanced self-checking asynchronous logic for 
smart card applications” Microprocessors and Microsystems 
27.9, pp. 421-430, 2003. 
[9]  N. Pramstaller, F. Gürkaynak, S. Häne, H. Kaeslin, N. Fel-
ber, and W. Fichtner, “Towards an AES Crypto-chip Resis-
tant to Differential Power Analysis”, ESSCIRC, pp. 307-310, 
2004. 
 
AES
memory
memory
AES
oracle
oracle
i/f
i/f
 
Figure 10. IC micrograph: Secure coprocessor using WDDL 
and differential routing (left); and Insecure coprocessor using 
standard cells and regular routing (right). 